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What works for boats and planes may 
not be so good for trucks and trains 
The fourth book in our Bite-Size book series ‘Brexit and Northern 
Ireland: Bordering on Confusion?’ has now been published and is 
available for you to enjoy! We’re celebrating the book’s release by 
giving you a sneak peek at Dr Katy Hayward’s chapter… 
Solving the issue of the border between Northern Ireland and the 
Republic of Ireland has proved intractable in the Brexit process. The 
issue of the Irish border and backstop could potentially derail an 
agreed Brexit creating significant economic damage to both parts of 
the island as well as undermining the peace achieved by the 1998 
Good Friday Agreement. 
Edited by ex-BBC journalist John Mair and Dr Steven McCabe from 
the Centre for Brexit Studies at Birmingham City University, as well as 
Leslie Budd from the Open University and Neil Fowler, the book 
includes a foreword from long-standing Northern Ireland commentator 
Malachi O’Doherty and an afterword by Daily Mail journalist Peter 
Oborne. 
The book examines the range of questions about Brexit and Northern 
Ireland from a wide variety of perspectives and is a major contribution 
to the debate about the issues. 
Enjoy your sneak peek below… 
What works for boats and planes may not be so good for trucks 
and trains 
Alternative arrangements are so named because they are intended to 
offer an alternative to the backstop – that part of the protocol on 
Ireland/Northern Ireland in the withdrawal agreement intended to act 
as a unique insurance policy in case of a hard Brexit. 
To even get across the starting line, therefore, they have to meet the 
same objectives as the backstop itself. And these have been clear 
since the guidelines for the Brexit negotiations were first drawn up: to 
avoid a hard Irish border, to protect north-south cooperation on the 
island of Ireland and to uphold the Good Friday Agreement. 
So if the backstop is to be removed, then it isn’t only the softness of 
the border that will be at risk – it is the 1998 Agreement itself. This is 
why the backstop is more than a technical or economic matter. 
The EU and UK have seen what happens in Northern Ireland as being 
closely related to the stability of the peace process itself. If the border 
becomes more significant in practical terms, it also becomes more 
significant in symbolic ones too. And key to the success of the 1998 
Agreement was defusing the ‘Irish border’ as a point of political 
contestation. 
In the context of Brexit, Unionist sensitivities regarding the symbolic 
importance of the ‘Irish Sea’ border between Northern Ireland and 
Great Britain have also risen. This is why the socio-political 
environment in which the backstop or alternative arrangements are 
operationalised is as important as the technical environment. 
But the overwhelming focus of the quest for alternative arrangements 
has centred on the hardness of the border. 
Different definitions 
It has been clear for a long time that the UK government and 
European Commission have very different definitions of what 
constitutes a ‘hard’ border. While the UK has focused on its visibility 
(on the assumption that if you can’t see it, it’s not hard), the EU has 
pushed a much broader understanding of border friction. 
The EU’s understanding of border friction comes from the logic of 
European integration, which is that the more closely matched rules 
and laws are on either side of a border, the easier it is to move across 
it. This difference has meant that the two have ‘talked past’ each other 
on the issue. But it need not necessarily mean that the two cannot 
come to an agreement on alternatives to the backstop (or versions of 
the backstop) at some point down the line. 
And what might such alternatives be? The best way of understanding 
these is to conceptualise the fundamental challenge of border 
management – for this is really core to the whole problem. 
In managing any state border, there are three principles in play: 
1. We know what is crossing the border; 
2. We know that it meets the criteria for doing so; 
3. We can prevent entry/exit if needs be. In order to understand 
(and, perhaps, to resolve) the post-Brexit Irish border 
conundrum, it is helpful to conceive the challenge in these 
terms. 
The backstop addresses the challenge by concentrating on the most 
substantial of the ‘cornerstones’ of border management, i.e. by 
ensuring that goods crossing the border meet the criteria for doing so. 
This relates to the logic of European integration noted above. 
First, the backstop makes it unnecessary to have customs procedures 
apply at the Irish border because these have been applied already 
and because the UK will be in the customs territory of the EU. 
Second, it makes it possible to assume that goods within and 
produced in Northern Ireland meet EU single market standards. 
Finally, Northern Ireland remains in the VAT regime of the EU, which 
means that Northern Ireland will have to stay aligned to EU VAT rules 
regarding goods in order that exports crossing the border will not be 
liable for VAT at the point of entry. Thus, if the backstop was fully in 
place, the working assumption for the EU and UK can be that goods 
crossing the Irish border meet the criteria for doing so, thus no need 
for checks and controls. 
It is possible to have alternative arrangements that may also seek to 
lever this cornerstone, albeit from a different direction, i.e. by ensuring 
that the criteria for crossing the border need not apply. 
Exemptions and their challenges 
Exemptions from the application of the rules have been proposed in 
various forms, e.g. a general exemption for small/micro enterprises, 
the drawing up of ‘free-trade zones’ or special economic zones across 
the border, or the invocation of the ‘security clause’ of GATT which 
allows temporary lifting of the rules. 
These are problematic in their own way, but the first and biggest 
challenge is that of retaining the confidence (a) of 
consumers/customers and (b) external trading partners if it becomes 
known that Northern Ireland is the place where a blessing is given to 
breaches of the rules. 
Secondly, it is a fundamental cornerstone of border management to 
know what is crossing the border. However, this cannot stand entirely 
alone; it must work in conjunction with the other two cornerstones. 
In knowing what is crossing the border, it must be possible to be sure 
that it is allowed to cross and it must also be possible to prevent entry 
if required. This is where we have particular problems when it comes 
to the post-Brexit Irish border. 
It is true that advance cargo information is absolutely key for risk 
analysis. However, opportunities for submission and analysis of 
advance information in respect of land border movements are at best 
limited and at worst non-existent. This is why such a high inspection 
rate applies to the land border crossing points at the EU borders. 
Comparisons with maritime or air freight in terms of risk analysis 
based on advance information are meaningless. It needs to be 
acknowledged that any alternative arrangements relying primarily on 
advance cargo information will require a level of data sharing and 
analysis that is currently not known anywhere in the world when it 
comes to crossing a land border. The more distant the relationship 
between the UK and the EU, the more difficult such data sharing will 
be. 
Finally, the prevention of entry of goods across a border is the crudest 
cornerstone of border management. 
It is worth noting that this form of border management works very well 
in air and (to a lesser extent) maritime ports. In such cases, the border 
tends to naturally be a ‘hard’ border (i.e. difficult to cross) and border 
management takes the form of literally facilitating easier and more 
efficient movement across the border. 
Enjoy the rest of the chapter, as well as a whole host of 
contributions, by purchasing Brexit and Northern Ireland: 
Bordering on Confusion?. The book is available NOW in 
paperback and in Kindle. Find out more here. 
